

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED BY McClapen DATE 3-13-81

RDS/EXT. DATE _____

TS AUTH. _____ REASON(S) _____

ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS ☐

DECLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED ☒

RELEASE DATED _____

PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS _____

② / 6 Duly
Death
2/14/79

Ⓡ

THE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN'S REPORT ON THEIR RESPONSE TO THE KIDNAPPING OF AMBASSADOR DUBS

[Text] At precisely 0845 hours on 14 February 1979, Mohammed Yunis, Manager of the Kabul Hotel, reported by telephone to me, the Chief of the Kabul Police Department, "Four armed people, accompanied by the American Ambassador, entered the hotel, threatened me with their weapon, and said that a room with its key should be given to them."

As soon as I heard this report, I took action at once and, five minutes later, i.e., at 0850 hours, Kabul police forces had surrounded the Kabul Hotel. Likewise, since the situation was unclear, the whole police force, and especially the traffic police, was instructed to control the surrounding streets leading to the center of the city and to search all of the automobiles in the city so that, if, as had been reported, the terrorists were not in the Kabul Hotel and were trying to escape, they would be apprehended.

Naturally, I reported the incident to my superiors within seconds by telephone and they were informed about the case.

I, the Chief of the Kabul Police Department, with my own security agents, was led by two hotel officials named Mohammed Ehsan and Qajir Naman to the room where the armed band was holding the American ambassador. The room in question was Room 117. In order to verify the presence of the ambassador and the terrorists, I spoke with them from behind the door and, after ascertaining their presence there, I asked about their motive. They said that they would identify themselves later. It was explained to them that the Chief of the Kabul Police Department, himself, had introduced himself to them. In response, they said, "We will not disclose our motive for this action until our first condition is met," and they stated that their first condition was the release of Bahreddin Ba'es from prison. They added that he should be armed when turned over. They gave 30 minutes time i.e., from 0900-0930 hours to meet this condition.

When this period of time expired, additional time was requested, and an extension of 30 minutes, from 0930-1000 hours, was given.

The additional time was requested because the person they wanted was not available. Previously, while receiving medical treatment, he had escaped from the hospital and he was still a fugitive. Therefore, considering the above facts,

meeting that condition was impossible and disclosing that was also impossible because of our certainty that, if this was not disclosed, it would not cause the elimination of the American ambassador and there might be an opportunity to rescue the ambassador and to ponder a solution to this problem.

Brief Biography of Ba'es

Bahreddin Ba'es previously was imprisoned during the Zaher monarchy for his troublesome and extremist activities. Finally, he was released from prison at the time of the coup d'etat of 17 July. Still, he did not cease his inhumane activities and he continued his extremist trouble-making. In 1353 [21 March 1974-20 March 1975], he went to Darwaz Badakhshan and, there, he and his gang attacked the district. Consequently, a large number of young people of this area became the victims of this action by the above gang.

The security forces at that time were able to capture Ba'es and his cohorts and, during the interrogation, he confessed to his crime and was sentenced by the court to long-term imprisonment.

Bahreddin Ba'es, feigning illness, at that same time (the time of Daud Shahi), had been able to get himself hospitalized and, using the same tactic, he tried to find an escape route from the hospital; but, the security forces captured him 100 meters outside of the hospital. He was transferred to prison again, and the Khalqist Government decided that this known incorrigible should not be released.

During the month of Asad 1356 [22 July-21 August 1977], feigning illness, Ba'es was able, once again, to get himself hospitalized and, this time, he was guarded by four members of the Armed Forces inside the hospital. Ba'es, however, by means of his cohorts who fired repeatedly on the guards, once again, was saved and he escaped. As a result of the firing by one of the guards, however, he was also wounded. Ever since, Ba'es has been living in hiding.

This opportunity was used to make contact with the American Embassy so that it might send its representative to interpret our objectives to the ambassador, himself. Consequently, the Embassy representative was present and he was briefed so that he might explain to the ambassador, in the German language, that he should get away from the terrorists on the pretext of going to the bathroom and, if this was impossible, he should fall into a faint on the floor of the room.

Just as the Embassy representative, at the door of the room, called to the ambassador and the ambassador answered, the leader of the terrorists immediately said, "I am not foolish enough to permit the ambassador to make use of any imposter who will be present," and, because of this intervention, the objectives mentioned were impossible. He repeatedly threatened, "If our demand is not met at the appointed time, the ambassador will die." Since the time had expired, he was asked to extend the deadline again because of the difficulties encountered and the deadline was extended for 30 more minutes, i.e., from 1000 hours to 1030 hours.

This period of time was ?obtained? in order to find a solution (a way to rescue H.E. the Ambassador); but, ostensibly, it was for the purpose of getting the person they wanted.

This time was used to get fire-fighting equipment on the scene and the security agents were instructed to climb through the rear window by means of this equipment and, if possible, kill the terrorists. Meanwhile they were to keep watch at the window and they were to take effective action with the equipment they had to rescue the ambassador to prevent any type of evil action by the terrorists.

Once again additional time was requested and, after great insistence, the deadline was extended from 1030 hours to 1100 hours. During this time, various aspects of these operations were studied, taking into consideration the hostile attitude of the terrorists, and an evaluation was made of what necessary measures we would resort to in order to save the life of H.E. the Ambassador. While laying the plan, the time expired and, again, they were asked for an extension of time since the person they wanted was located far away and his arrival would take a while and, although swift action had been taken during the extensions of time given to transfer him, he still had not arrived. Finally, the terrorists warned that they were extending the deadline for the last time to 1230 hours. Using this time, a contingency operational plan was drawn up, i.e., the actions the police force would take if the time expired and they resorted to implementing their decision. It was decided that the police forces would be organized into and assigned to two groups, i. e., an operations group inside the hotel and an operations group outside the hotel, so that, using the tactics planned, they might take action against any probable attack of the terrorists against the safety of H.E. the Ambassador. For carrying out this objective, three policemen, dressed in bullet-proof clothing, were stationed at the door of the room where the ambassador was located. Moreover, a group was stationed behind the hotel to stand guard at the window of the room in question and to watch the situation through the window. Instructions were given to both groups to watch the situation and, when the terrorists attacked the ambassador, they were to take action in accordance with the plan that had been explained beforehand. Although extremely ?bitter? minutes were passing and the minutes were being counted in order that the safety of H.E. the Ambassador would not be jeopardized and in the hope that somehow we would be able to put an end to this inhumane action of the terrorists, the minutes swiftly passed. When 1225 hours approached, they were asked to extend the deadline a few more minutes.

In response, they angrily stated, "We are not children. If our demand is not met within the next ten minutes, first we will kill the ambassador and then we will kill ourselves and blow up the hotel."

It was explained to them that the failure to meet their demand was not intentional; rather, the great distance had been the cause of this delay. But little attention was paid and they insisted that they could not extend the deadline further.

Although during this period of time contacts and requests for an extension of the deadline were made repeatedly, nevertheless, they did not consent and the minutes passed. At the end of the ten minutes, since the terrorists would not agree to

extend the deadline, the aforementioned security forces took action to rescue the ambassador and, simultaneously, the sound of firing was heard from inside the room. These operations were over in a few minutes; but, unfortunately, when the rescue squad entered the room in question, they encountered H.E. the Ambassador with three bloody bodies and one person firing. The wounded terrorist was taken to the hospital and the doctors tried to treat him in order that the true facts of the ?destruction? inflicted might be discovered; but, this earnest effort was fruitless and, thus, the last person of this criminal, terrorist band died. Likewise, H. E. the Ambassador died at the moment when, for the sake of reviving him, the guards and Embassy mission were transporting him in the American Embassy's ambulance to their hospital. Thus ended this slaughter.

The following weapons were discovered in the search of the site of the incident:

- 1) One unmarked (CMH) machine gun,
- 2) One hand grenade (No. 36M),
- 3) One ?pistol? with No. 777272 STAR on its ?barrel? and 10 shells, and
- 4) One pistol, calibre: 7.65 mm, and six shells.

According to the statement of the chauffeur of H. E. the United States Ambassador in Kabul: "The aforementioned automobile was stopped by a traffic ? ? opposite the American Cultural Center a little distance from the Tarreh Bazkhan intersection. When I rolled down the window of the automobile, he said, 'Your automobile is in the wrong. We will search it.' As soon as I opened the door, the aforementioned traffic policeman placed a gun against my chest and said, 'Don't get excited.' At that moment, three more armed people appeared. While the traffic policemen, with two of the others, sat next to the ambassador, one of them sat next to me. They put a gun to my chest and one to the chest of the ambassador and said, 'To the Kabul Hotel at the Habori intersection at full speed and don't stop.' On the way, they said, 'We have taken the ambassador hostage.' As soon as we reached the door of the hotel, all four people and the ambassador got out of the automobile and, again, they said to me, 'We have taken the ambassador hostage. Go and tell the Embassy.' The ambassador told them, 'Take your weapons away from my side. I shall accompany you wherever you want to go.' After leaving the automobile, they said, 'Open [sic] the door of the automobile.'" The driver then lowered the flag and went to the Embassy and reported the matter to the Embassy official. Through Ghafari, the interpreter, he contacted the Chief of Police regarding the assassination of the ambassador.

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